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I. WENDELL REEDER V. WOOD COUNTY ENERGY, L.L.C.
In a decision handed down on August 31, 2012, the Texas Supreme
Court compared the exculpatory language in the 1977 and 1982
AAPL Model Form 610 Joint Operating Agreements (JOAs) to the
corresponding exculpatory language in the 1989 Form JOA.1 In
Reeder, the Court found that the operator was not liable for its activi-
ties under the JOA unless those activities involved gross negligence or
willful misconduct, including a failure to conduct activities contractu-
ally prescribed.2
In Reeder, the Court considered the case of an operator who faced
claims by non-operators that it had failed to maintain production in
paying quantities, causing oil and gas leases potentially worth millions
of dollars to expire and the Texas Railroad Commission to break apart
a unit and suspend operations therein.3 The operations were con-
ducted pursuant to the 1989 Form JOA and, at trial, a jury found the
operator had breached its duty to the non-operators by failing to
maintain production in paying quantities.4 The court of appeals af-
firmed and held that the exculpatory clause in the JOA at issue should
not have applied to shield the operator from the claims of the non-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Texas Tech School of Law; Of Counsel, Haynes
and Boone, LLP.
1. Wendell Reeder v. Wood Cnty. Energy, L.L.C., 395 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2012).
2. Id. at 797.
3. Id. at 791–92.
4. Id. at 792.
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operators because the clause did not apply to breach of contract
claims like the ones before the court.5 Therefore, it was not necessary
that the operator first be found to have behaved with either gross neg-
ligence or willful misconduct.
The Supreme Court of Texas first noted that, unlike the earlier ver-
sions of the form JOA that state that the “[Operator] shall conduct all
such operations in a good and workmanlike manner, but it shall have
no liability as Operator to the other parties for losses sustained or
liabilities incurred, except such as may result from gross negligence or
willful misconduct,” the 1989 Form JOA provides that the “[Operator]
shall conduct its activities under this agreement as a reasonable prudent
operator, in a good and workmanlike manner, with due diligence and
in accordance with good oilfield practice.”6 However, the form retains
the earlier versions’ language regarding operator liability and states
that “in no event shall it have any liability as Operator to the other
parties for losses sustained or liabilities incurred except such as may
result from gross negligence or willful misconduct.”7
On prior occasions, in examining the scope of the exculpatory
clause in the 1977 and 1982 Form JOAs, Texas courts of appeals con-
cluded that the scope of the exculpatory clause is limited to claims
that the operator failed to act as a reasonably prudent operator, and
does not extend to other breaches under the JOA. One court rea-
soned that, as the exculpatory clause is linked directly to the “imposi-
tion of the duty to act as a reasonably prudent operator, which strictly
concerns the manner in which the operator conducts drilling opera-
tions on the lease . . .  the exculpatory clause should not be expanded
to include claims against the operator for breach of contract.”8 This
interpretation is buttressed by other courts who view the exculpatory
clause’s location within the “operations” section of the JOA, and not
within the broader “liability of the parties” section, as indicative of the
intent of the parties with respect to what liability, exactly, is intended
to be limited.
However, drawing upon the difference between the exculpatory
language of “its activities under this agreement” in the prior form
JOAs versus “all such operations” in the 1989 Form JOA, and noting
that some commentators9 have concluded the 1989 Form JOA pro-
vided for a more expansive exoneration of the operator, the Supreme
Court of Texas held the 1989 Form JOA exculpatory language broad-
5. Id.
6. Id. at 793 (emphasis added).
7. Id.
8. Abraxas Petroleum Corp. v. Hornburg, 20 S.W.3d 741, 759 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2000, pet. denied).
9. See Robert Bledsoe, The Operating Agreement: Matters Not Covered or Inade-
quately Covered, 47 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 15.03[1] (2001); see also Wilson
Woods, The Effect of Exculpatory Clauses in Joint Operating Agreements, 38 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 211, 214–15 (2005).
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ened the range of operator activities covered by the exculpatory
clause outside of those strictly relating to operations under the JOA.10
Specifically, this interpretation of the 1989 Form JOA exculpatory
clause yields that the clause covers not only basic oilfield operations
but also all activities covered under the form JOA. The Court opined,
“The [1989 Form JOA exculpatory clause] implicates a broader scope
of conduct following the language of the contract. The agreed stan-
dard exempts the operator from liability for its activities unless its lia-
bility-causing conduct is due to gross negligence or willful
misconduct.”11 After subsequently finding that the operator had not
acted with gross negligence or willful misconduct, the Court reversed
and ruled in favor of the operator.12
The implication of Reeder is that application of the exculpatory
clause to a failure by the operator to satisfy basic contractual obliga-
tions under the 1989 Form JOA may render such breach not actiona-
ble unless the breach rises to the level of “gross negligence or willful
misconduct,” as determined by the fact-finder. The operator in
Reeder, and after Reeder perhaps all operators under a 1989 Form
JOA, would be exempted from liability to non-operators if the opera-
tor acts with mere ordinary negligence.
II. EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTHORITY V. DAY
On February 24, 2012, after a wait of almost two years from oral
argument, the Texas Supreme Court released its opinion in Edwards
Aquifer Authority v. Day.13 The opinion contained two significant
statements regarding ownership and use of groundwater pumped to
the surface and stored in an impoundment.14
Day, a party comprised of two individuals who were the successors
to a water-right holder that produced groundwater from an artesian
well and then stored it in an impoundment, applied to the Edwards
Aquifer Authority for a water well permit.15 The original water-right
holder had used the water that was in the impoundment only for rec-
reation purposes.16 The Edwards Aquifer Authority found that the
water in the impoundment, due to being produced and stored but not
used for purposes seen as “beneficial,” was now state water and be-
yond the control of both the Edwards Aquifer Authority and the sur-
face owner.17
10. Reeder, 395 S.W.3d at 795.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 797.
13. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012).
14. Id. at 814.
15. Id. at 818.
16. Id. at 823.
17. Id. at 821.
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Surface water in Texas is primarily regulated by the Texas Commis-
sion on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), while groundwater is prima-
rily regulated across the state by either municipalities or local
groundwater conservation districts. First, a question arose over the
Edwards Aquifer Authority’s finding that the water in the impound-
ment was now state-controlled surface water (and therefore subject to
the jurisdiction of the TCEQ) and was therefore beyond the Edwards
Aquifer Authority’s sway with regards to Day’s water well drilling ap-
plication.18 After litigation and appeal, the Texas Supreme Court first
held that the necessary evidence was present so that the Edwards Aq-
uifer Authority could find that such impoundment water had changed
its character and become “state water” if not put to a beneficial use.19
In this instance, no evidence of prior use of the water by Day or
Day’s predecessor existed except for some water-based recreation.20
The Court recited that it was not holding that such produced water
always becomes state water or that an impoundment or lake could
never be used to store groundwater for use by its original owner, but
that the water would then have to be used for some beneficial purpose
such as irrigation, not mere recreation.21
Next, the Court addressed the larger issue of whether land owner-
ship in fee included a real property interest in the groundwater there-
under and whether that interest, if present, is subject to the Texas
constitutional requirement of adequate compensation in the event of a
“taking” for a public purpose.22 In likening water to oil and gas, the
Court held that water can be owned in place by one owner while
neighboring parties are allowed to drain it without liability through
the rule of capture.23 After distinguishing earlier cases involving the
rule of capture, the Court then examined various relevant factors used
to analyze whether the Edwards Aquifer Authority’s denial of Day’s
application had resulted in a “taking” that required compensation,
namely whether the tests enumerated in the U.S. Supreme Court
cases of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council24 and Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York25 would be applied.26
Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Texas agreed with the court of
appeals and remanded the case back to the district court for a deter-
mination of whether a “taking” requiring compensation had occurred
and, if so, what compensation might be required.27 Most importantly,
18. Id. at 822.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 823.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 822.
23. Id. at 823.
24. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
25. Penn. Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
26. Day, 369 S.W.3d at 838.
27. Id. at 822.
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land ownership now includes an interest in the actual groundwater in
place—like oil and gas in Texas—and not merely an exclusive license
to develop it, as in Oklahoma.
This decision will impact future oil and gas operations that require
permitting to drill water wells for drilling and recovery projects. One
commentator has noted that since the analysis required for the Penn
Central test is a fact-intensive balancing of factors specific to each
case, such litigation will often require extensive expert witness analy-
sis and testimony, discovery, and extensive trial preparation.28 There-
fore, when groundwater conservation districts are determining
whether or not to withhold a permit, they will have to be mindful of
whether a “taking” has occurred and, if so, what compensation may be
required. This may make them reluctant to deny permits in similar
situations in the future to avoid litigation and possible subsequent
“takings” liability.
III. OCCIDENTAL PERMIAN LTD. V. MARCIA FULLER FRENCH
On October 31, 2012, the Eastland Court of Appeals issued an opin-
ion in which it considered a case involving a suit brought by Marcia
Fuller French and other royalty owners (collectively, “French”) who
sued the successor lessee and operator of the Cogdell Canyon Reef
Unit (Unit), Occidental Permian Ltd. (Occidental), to recover certain
royalty payments under two oil and gas leases located in Scurry and
Kent Counties, Texas.29
As unit operator, Occidental had instigated a tertiary recovery op-
eration using CO2 purchased from Kinder Morgan CO2 Company
(Kinder Morgan).30 This operation resulted in casinghead gas along
with oil being produced where the casinghead gas stream was com-
prised of up to 85.0% CO2.31 After severance at the wellhead, Kinder
Morgan transported the production stream to its Cynara production
facility fifteen miles away where the CO2 was removed from the pro-
duction stream along with two-thirds of the natural gas liquids
(NGLs).32 This extracted CO2 was transported back to the Unit to be
reused. The remaining gas stream, NGLs, and oil were then sent from
Cynara to the Snyder Gas Plant, wherein the remaining CO2 was ex-
tracted (and sent back to the Unit), the NGLs were stabilized, and the
resultant stream was processed for sale.33
28. See Jeff Civins, Ground(water)-Breaking Decision, LAW360, available at http://
www.law360.com/articles/315752/print?section=appellate (subscription required) (last
visited Oct. 31, 2013).
29. Occidental Permian, Ltd. v. French, 391 S.W.3d 215, 217 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2012, pet. filed).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 218.
33. Id.
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This tertiary operation was conducted pursuant to the terms of a
certain Treating and Processing Agreement (Agreement) between Oc-
cidental and Kinder Morgan that required Occidental to pay Kinder
Morgan two bundled fees per month.34 The first fee was a monetary
charge from which no deduction from French’s royalty was made.35
The second “in-kind” fee was comprised of 30% of the value of the
NGLs and 100% of the value of the casinghead gas stream produced
from the Unit.36 Since no royalty was paid on the in-kind fee, the in-
kind fee was essentially a deduction from royalty.37
French brought suit to recover royalty it deemed it was owed from
the production attributable to the in-kind fee (30% of the value of the
NGLs and 100% of the value of the casinghead gas stream).38 French
argued that the CO2 project was a “production activity” and that the
in-kind fee constituted an unlawful shorting of the amount of produc-
tion upon which royalty was due.39 French claimed this shorting differ-
entiated this case from nearly all other such reported cases in that the
actual royalty payments were not being challenged, but rather the vol-
ume upon which the royalty payment was deficient.40
After a bench trial, the district court agreed with French and held
that Occidental had not paid royalty on all of the gas produced from
the Unit, and therefore royalty was due on the 30% of the value of the
NGLs and the total value of the casinghead gas stream, being the
same amount of the in-kind gas fee.41
On appeal, after noting that one lease contained a gas royalty clause
stipulating that royalty was due on the “market value” of the gas,
while the other provided that royalty was due on the “net proceeds”
of the gas, the court of appeals focused on the issue of whether the
evidence actually supported the finding that Occidental had un-
derpaid royalties by not including casinghead gas and NGLs values
attributable to the in-kind fee.42
As for the “market value” lease, the court of appeals noted it is up
to the plaintiff to prove market value at the well by using comparable
arm-length sales prices, or when such are not available, the “net-back”
method.43 After examining the record, the court of appeals found the
trial court had not used sufficient evidence to determine the compara-
ble arm-length sales price.44 Turning to the “net-back” method used
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 219–21.
43. Id. at 221.
44. Id. at 221–22.
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by French and accepted by the trial court, the court of appeals re-
versed, holding that processing costs at the Cynara plant were post-
production costs that were deductible from royalty.45 Therefore, since
no deduction was calculated for processing at Cynara, French’s calcu-
lation of market value using the “net-back” was incomplete and thus
conducted erroneously.46 Because neither test used for determining
market value was properly supported by evidence, the evidence was
not sufficient to prove that Occidental had underpaid royalty on the
“market value” lease.47
Turning to the “net proceeds” lease, the court of appeals cited Bow-
den v. Phillips Petroleum Co.48 for the Texas rule that “proceeds” or
“amount realized” clauses require measurement of the royalty based
on the amount the lessee in fact receives under the gas or oil sales
contract.49 Since the trial court’s royalty calculation did not include
the deduction of the cost to remove H2S and other processing activi-
ties at Cynara, the court of appeals held again that the evidence relied
upon by the trial court was insufficient to prove that Occidental had
underpaid royalties on the “net-back” lease.50
The court of appeals then addressed the finding of the trial court
that Occidental had violated the implied covenant to market in the
leases.51 As to the “market value” lease, the court of appeals, citing
Bowden,52 noted that the Texas Supreme Court had repeatedly made
clear that no such implied covenant existed in “market value” lease.53
As for the “amount received” lease, while the court of appeals ac-
knowledged that the implied covenant to market could exist, it found
the evidence relied upon by the trial court insufficient to show that
Occidental had not acted as a reasonably prudent operator.54 In the
end, the court of appeals reversed on Occidental’s points of error and
ordered French to take nothing.55
IV. HARDING COMPANY V. SENDERO RESOURCES, INC.
In January 2012, the Texarkana Court of Appeals decided a claim
arising out of a noncompete clause within an agreement (Agreement)
for prospect development and oil and gas lease acquisition in East
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 224.
48. Bowden v. Petroleum Co., 247 S.W.3d 690, 699 (Tex. 2008).
49. Occidental, 391 S.W.3d at 224.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Bowden, 247 S.W.3d at 701.
53. Occidental, 391 S.W.3d at 224–25.
54. Id. at 225.
55. Id.
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Texas.56 The president of Sendero Resources (Sendero), Ted Walters,
was also the president and sole shareholder of TWW Tyler, Inc., and
limited partner to Ted Walters and Associates, L.P., along with
Sendero, which was the general partner.57 In 2007, Harding Company
(Harding) contracted with (1) Sendero, (2) a geologist named Surles,
and (3) a landman named Boney who was employed by Associates,
L.P. to develop a prospect known as the “Star Prospect,” an activity
that included acquiring oil and gas leases in six counties along the
Louisiana border.58 Ted Walters signed the Agreement for Sendero in
his capacity of president of that entity.59 Section 5 of the Agreement
was a noncompete clause prohibiting Sendero, Surles, Boney, and
“Walters” (with no further explanation to whom “Walters” covered)
from competing against Harding for the acquisition oil and gas leases
in an area defined in the Agreement.60
In July 2008, Boney informed Harding that TWW Tyler had been
assisting competitors of Harding in acquiring oil and gas leases in the
area covered by the Agreement.61 As a result, Harding refused to pay
Sendero for services rendered under the Agreement.62 In response,
Sendero, Surles, and Boney brought suit alleging Harding breached
the terms of the Agreement.63 Harding counterclaimed against
Sendero, TWW Tyler, Associates, and Ted Walters, alleging breach of
the noncompete clause of the Agreement as well as numerous torts
such as fraud.64
The district court granted Sendero’s motion for summary judg-
ment.65 On appeal, the Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed that the
president of Sendero signed in his corporate authority and thus did
not bind any other entities that he controlled.66 The court disagreed
with Harding’s argument that to disallow the Agreement to be bind-
ing on TWW Tyler would render a portion of Section 5 of the Agree-
ment meaningless, a result disfavored by Texas courts when
interpreting a contract.67 The court opined instead that this canon of
interpretation is qualified with the phrase “if possible” and that a gen-
eral rule of contract interpretation cannot be used to bind a party to a
contract it did not sign.68
56. Harding Co. v. Sendero Res., Inc., 365 S.W.3d 732, 735–36 (Tex. App.—Texar-
kana 2012, pet. denied).
57. Id. at 736.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 737.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 738.
66. Id. at 739.
67. Id. at 740.
68. Id.
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However, the court of appeals reversed the district court’s holding
that, as a matter of law, Harding was not owed a fiduciary duty by
TWW Tyler and Associates, holding instead that there was a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether one of the president’s other enti-
ties acted as an agent and thus owed Harding a fiduciary duty.
V. SEITEL DATA, LTD. V. SIMMONS
On January 18, 2012, the Texarkana Court of Appeals released the
opinion of an appeal from the 273rd District Court in Shelby County
that considered a breach of contract action against seismic company
Seitel Data, Ltd. (Seitel) to recover damages alleged to have been
caused to a water well on property operated by Ralph and Laura Sim-
mons (collectively, “Simmons”).69 The seismic operation was con-
ducted by Seitel pursuant to the terms of a contract that stipulated
that Seitel would be “responsible for damages [to Simmons], if any
should occur, due to seismic operations.”70
After seismic operations occurred, one of Simmons’s two water
wells began to experience problems with produced sand and mud
where only freshwater was alleged to have been produced before seis-
mic operations began.71 Simmons brought suit in both tort and con-
tract to recover for this alleged damage.72 At trial, Simmons presented
no expert testimony on whether or not the seismic testing caused the
alleged damage to the well, relying instead upon “lay testimony” by
Ralph and Laura Simmons themselves and the driller of the water
well.73 Regardless, at trial the jury awarded Simmons damages under
both fraud and contract theories.74 Although the jury found for Sim-
mons on both tort/fraud and contract theories, Simmons ultimately
relied solely on their contract claim for recovery.75 Seitel appealed.76
Upon appeal, Seitel argued the expert testimony was necessary and
that its absence here invalidated the claim of Simmons.77 The court of
appeals first noted that whether expert testimony is necessary in gen-
eral is a question of law.78 The court then opined that for Seitel to
prevail, it would have to show that, with regards to seismic activity,
the liability analysis under contract theory is the same as under tort
theory, which would require expert witness testimony to establish a
standard of care.79 Limited Texas case law presented by Seitel was
69. Seitel Data, Ltd. v. Simmons, 362 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. App.—Texarkana, 2012).
70. Id. at 784 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 785.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 787.
79. Id. at 788.
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then described that attempted to illustrate that expert witness testi-
mony is clearly necessary to prevail in tort against a seismic com-
pany,80 but the court of appeals distinguished the cited case both on its
facts and on procedural history.81
The court of appeals affirmed the district court, holding that expert
testimony was unnecessary in this case and that the lay testimony
presented was adequate to prove causation because jurors could apply
general experience and “common sense” understanding to establish,
with reasonable probability, the relationship between vibrations
caused by seismic-related blasting and damage to the water well.82
The court of appeals therefore refused to establish a bright-line rule
that expert testimony is necessary to establish the connection between
blasting associated with seismic surveying and damages to surface as-
sets such as the water well.83
Seitel also argued that under the language of the contractual provi-
sion, Simmons is required to show evidence robust enough to meet
the proximate cause standard in order to prevail.84 In response, Sim-
mons argued that this standard is applicable only in tort, not actions
rooted in contract.85 The court of appeals, relying on the holding in
Utica National Insurance Co. of Texas v. American Indemnity Co.86
(wherein a clause in a contract that excluded claims for injury “due
to” the rendering of professional services required a more unequivo-
cal causation than the term “arising out of”), ruled that, while the
“due to” language in the contract at issue here indeed required a
closer causation than “arises out of” language, the phrase did not
equal proximate causation.87 In addition, while a mere suspicion—like
that raised by having an event (the seismic survey) followed by an
effect (the sand in the well)—is not legally sufficient to support a find-
ing of causation in a tort case, here the court of appeals found enough
basis in the evidence to show that the sequence of events, combined
with the general knowledge of the jury about the result of seismic
charges going off, provided more than a suspicion (or a scintilla) to
adequately connect the actions of Seitel with the damage to
Simmons.88
80. See Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Lambert, 222 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Civ. App.—San
Antonio 1949, no writ).
81. Seitel Data, 362 S.W.3d at 788–89.
82. Id. at 792.
83. Id. at 791 (refusal to find such a bright-line rule was not expressly limited to
contract claims).
84. Id. at 792.
85. Id.
86. Utica Nat’l Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Am. Indem. Co., 141 S.W.3d 198, 202 (Tex.
2004).
87. Seitel Data, 362 S.W.3d at 792.
88. Id. at 793–94.
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VI. FRIDDLE V. FISHER
On August 17, 2012, the Texarkana Court of Appeals decided an
appeal from the 62nd Judicial District Court in Hopkins County,
Texas, that dealt with an executive mineral interest owner, Fisher
(Lessor), that executed an oil and gas lease but did not inform a non-
participating royalty interest (NPRI) owner, Friddle (the NPRI
Owner), of the existence of the lease covering a tract encumbered by
its NPRI.89 In addition, the lessee, Valence Operating Company, Inc.
(Lessee), also failed to inform the NPRI Owner of the lease.90 When a
non-tract well on pooled acreage was brought in as a producer, Lessee
paid the entire royalty due from the well attributable to the pooled
leased acreage, including the portion of that royalty attributable to the
NPRI, calculated at over $90,000, to Lessor.91
The NPRI Owner sued Lessor and Lessee to recover its alleged
share of the total royalty.92 The portion of the case against Lessee was
severed. The district court granted summary judgment to Lessor.93 On
appeal, the NPRI Owner argued that the trial court erred in granting
Lessor summary judgment, claiming that its claims for conversion, un-
just enrichment, need for a constructive trust, and fraud were not ad-
dressed in Lessor’s motion for summary judgment that the district
court signed.94 The NPRI Owner also argued that there existed dis-
puted issues of material fact.95
In addition, the NPRI Owner claimed that Lessor owed it a fiduci-
ary duty and therefore a duty to notify the NPRI Owner of the execu-
tion of the lease, activation of the pooling provision, and the
beginning of production.96 Finally, the NPRI Owner claimed that the
district court misapplied Texas law concerning the discovery rule and
that the NPRI Owner in that case had neither actual nor constructive
notice of its claim against Lessor at the time that its claim would have
been barred by limitations.97 Lessor countered that it owed no duty to
notify the NPRI Owner, asserting that the NPRI Owner had either
actual or constructive notice of the lease and pooled unit.98 Lessor
also asserted that the statute of limitations barred recovery for any of
the NPRI Owner’s causes of action.99
89. Friddle v. Fisher, 378 S.W.3d 475, 478 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet.
denied).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 479.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 479.
99. Id. at 482–83.
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The court of appeals reversed and remanded, first distinguishing
this case from Montgomery v. Rittersbacher, wherein the Texas Su-
preme Court—facing a similar question, but one where the lessee had
paid all the money attributable to the leasehold into a court registry
instead of to the lessor—held that by bringing suit to claim the roy-
alty, the NPRI owner had ratified the lease and was therefore entitled
to only receive royalties accruing from and after the date the suit was
filed.100 Here, the court of appeals distinguished Montgomery by hold-
ing that since Lessor—who owed the NPRI Owner a fiduciary duty,
unlike the producer in Montgomery—had already collected the funds,
the rule established in Montgomery did not apply.101
Regarding the measure of duty that Lessor owed to the NPRI
Owner, the court of appeals cited recently decided Lesley v. Veterans
Land Board for the proposition that the executive rights holder owed
the NPRI owner a fiduciary duty of “utmost fair dealing.”102  The
court of appeals held that this duty not only required the executive to
get for the non-executive every benefit that the executive gets for it-
self, but that “[i]f the holder of the executive right receives royalties
pursuant to the rights held by an NPRI holder, he is chargeable in
equity as constructive trustee with the duty to hold the royalty attribu-
table to the holder of the NPRI.”103 Thus, the court held that Lessor,
when it elected to receive the entire royalty attributable to the lease,
had a duty to hold that portion of the funds payable to the NPRI
Owner as a constructive trustee.104 In addition, the court held that a
fact question existed as to whether Lessor had a duty to inform the
NPRI Owner of the lease or other agreement that affected the rights
of the NPRI Owner.105
Finally, regarding the statute of limitations, the court of appeals
held that the discovery rule tolled the statute because, even if the offi-
cial public records contained notification of the lease, the NPRI
Owner could not be chargeable with constructive notice of the lease
because it was executed and recorded after the NPRI Owner had ac-
quired the NPRI.106 In addition, the court held that a fact question
existed as to whether the NPRI Owner had actual notice of produc-
tion because the well on the unit that included the leasehold at issue
was both demarked by a sign and was in obvious view.107 Therefore, a
100. Montgomery v. Rittersbacher, 424 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Tex. 1968).
101. Friddle, 378 S.W.3d at 480.
102. Lesley v. Veterans Land Bd., 352 S.W.3d 479, 480–81 (Tex. 2011).
103. Friddle, 378 S.W.3d at 481 (citing Andretta v. West, 415 S.W.2d 638, 641–42
(Tex. 1967) (ruling that if the holder of the executive rights knows the name and
whereabouts of the NPRI owner, it had a duty to notify the NPRI owner of lease
developments and amendments and account to the NPRI owner for its portion of the
lease royalty)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 482.
106. Id. at 483–84.
107. Id. at 485.
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factual dispute existed that must be resolved by the district court.108
Finally, the court held that the lower court’s grant of summary judg-
ment did not address all of the NPRI Owner’s claims, further necessi-
tating remanding the case.109
VII. BRADSHAW V. STEADFAST FINANCIAL, L.L.C.110
In an opinion released on February 14, 2013, the Fort Worth Court
of Appeals sided with an NPRI owner who challenged the validity of a
lease with a high bonus and a low royalty.111 The court reversed a
summary judgment issued by the trial court in favor of the executive
of a tract of 1,800 acres in Hood County, Texas.112 Steadfast Financial,
L.L.C. (Steadfast) owned the surface, which it later assigned to Range
Resources Corp. (Range), and mineral estate, which it retained sub-
ject to Bradshaw’s NPRI.113 Steadfast executed a lease to Range for a
1/8 royalty and a bonus of $7,505 per acre.114 Following the lease,
Steadfast assigned royalties totaling 1/16 of oil and gas production to a
multitude of assignees, including its managing member.115 Bradshaw
brought suit against Steadfast, believing that the fiduciary duty owed
to it by the executive had been violated.116 Bradshaw argued that the
1/8 royalty clause was out of line with the prevailing 1/4 lessor’s roy-
alty more common in the region at the time and was combined with
high bonus to the detriment of the NPRI owner.117 Bradshaw also
brought suit against Range, arguing it had conspired with Steadfast to
draft the lease to Bradshaw’s disadvantage.118 As a remedy, Bradshaw
sought a constructive trust to be created upon the defendants’
interests.119
The court of appeals noted that the level of duty owed by the execu-
tive depends on the amount of control it had over the NPRI owner’s
property rights—basically, whether the royalty was a fraction of roy-
alty or a fixed fractional royalty.120 If the NPRI owner’s royalty was a
fraction of royalty, with the amount received by the NPRI owner de-
pendent on the lessor’s royalty fraction in the oil and gas lease negoti-
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Portions of the following case synopsis also appear in: Christopher Kulander,
The Executive Right to Lease Mineral Real Property in Texas Before and After Lesley
v. Veterans Land Bd., 44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1 (2013).
111. Bradshaw v. Steadfast Fin., L.L.C., 395 S.W.3d 348, 353 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2013, pet. filed).
112. Id. at 371.
113. Id. at 350.
114. Id. at 353.
115. Id. at 355.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 351.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 370 (emphasis added).
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ated by the executive, then the executive will be held to a high
standard of duty.121 Finding some evidence that a 1/8 royalty was not
the “going rate” of leases in the area at the time of the transaction
with Range, the court remanded the case back to the trial court.122
Now that bonus is firmly ensconced as a prime vector of profit for
lessees, Bradshaw may be the first of many challenges by NPRI own-
ers who feel that the leases covering their interests are not reflective
of prevailing leasing rates and perhaps represent a violation of the
duty owed them by the executive. Since an executive rights owner
could impact the amount received by an NPRI owner if the NPRI
interests are fractions of whatever royalty the executive negotiates,
executives should consider carefully whether the royalty and bonuses
they negotiate are noticeably out of step with similar leases in the
area.
VIII. CITY OF HOUSTON V. TRAIL ENTERPRISES, INC.
The Texas Fourteenth Court of Appeals handed down an opinion
on August 9, 2012, potentially deciding a long-standing dispute be-
tween mineral interest owners including Trail Enterprises, Inc. (collec-
tively, “Trail”) and the City of Houston (Houston) regarding the city’s
alleged inverse condemnation of Trail’s fee mineral interests in and
around the Lake Houston watershed.123 Specifically, the 2003 suit
against Houston claimed that restrictions on oil and gas drilling dating
from 1995 amendments to an ordinance dating originally from 1967
constituted a compensable taking of its property rights under the
Texas Constitution.124
In 2005, the trial court, in a bench trial, found in favor of Trail, with
a subsequently convened jury calculating damages at $19,046,700, be-
ing the diminution of value of the mineral property before and after
application of the drilling restrictions.125 Houston appealed, challeng-
ing the verdict on ripeness grounds in that Trail had not exhausted its
administrative remedies because it had not filed a formal application
for new drilling permits during a period in 1997 when the drilling ban
was temporarily abated.126 After the Texas Supreme Court found that
the claim was ripe, the trial court again found that a compensable tak-
ing had occurred.127 The trial court entered a judgment for Trail of
$17,000,000 and awarded Houston the oil and gas not recoverable
121. Id.
122. Id. at 370–71.
123. City of Hous. v. Trail Enters., Inc., 377 S.W.3d 873 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2012, pet. filed).
124. Id. at 876.
125. Id. at 877.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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from the wells that already existed on the field.128 Both parties ap-
pealed: Houston challenged the takings verdict and Trail appealed the
transfer of the mineral interests to Houston.129
Considering only Houston’s argument that Trail had not established
that a taking had occurred as dispositive and therefore only consider-
ing that claim in its opinion, the court of appeals reversed.130 Relying
on the Texas takings case of Sheffield Development Company v. City
of Glenn Heights,131 which in turn largely incorporated the analysis of
the U.S. Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Company v.
City of New York,132 the court of appeals considered the three factors
described in those cases for balancing of the public’s interest vis-a`-vis
the real property owner’s private interest.133 These factors are as fol-
lows: (1) the nature of the government’s action and whether it was
rationally related to a legitimate government end; (2) the investment-
backed expectations of the property owners; and (3) the economic im-
pact on the regulation or law upon the property owner.134
The court first found that, since the stated purpose of the drilling
ban was to protect the drinking water of Houston—an important goal
that could be compromised by drilling near the source of Lake Hous-
ton—the first factor leaned heavily in favor of Houston.135 The court
next found that, since the landowners had largely failed to prove any
investment-backed expectation of profit from their estate because
they could point to no investments that they made or put at risk to
develop the property, the second factor also leaned heavily in favor of
Houston.136 Finally, the court considered the economic impact of the
regulation on Trail, considering especially the diminution of value of
the mineral estate.137 While the court found significant loss of value to
the mineral estate, this loss was partially ameliorated by the facts that
some wells were producing from the restricted estate already and that
the restriction did not deny all economically beneficial use of the
property as the regulations did not prevent drilling of new wells on
70–75% of the total mineral property of Trail.138
Considering the three Penn Central/Sheffield factors in toto, the
court ultimately found that, while the anti-drilling regulations did sig-
nificantly affect the value of the mineral estate of Trail, the combina-
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 884–85.
131. Sheffield Dev. Co. v. City of Glenn Heights, 140 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2004).
132. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
133. Trail Enters., 377 S.W.3d at 878–89.
134. Id. at 879.
135. Id. at 879–80.
136. Id. at 880–83.
137. Id. at 883–84.
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tion of the other two factors outweighed the first, and the court ruled
that Trail should take nothing.139
IX. ROYALCO OIL & GAS CORP. V. STOCKHOME TRADING CORP.
On January 26, 2012, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals handed
down an opinion regarding whether: (1) the common law of leases
generally or (2) “traditional” Texas oil and gas law applies to the par-
tial transfer of a lessee’s interest in a disposal well lease agreement.140
In February 2008, Stockhome Trading Corp. (Lessor) entered into a
salt water disposal agreement (the Lease) with Triad Rovan Services,
L.P. (Lessee).141 The Lease stated that it “shall in no way affect own-
ership of the oil, gas, or minerals in, on, or under the [leased prem-
ises].”142 The Lease was stated to be for the sole purpose of allowing
Lessee to conduct its “business activities” on the captioned land,
which were defined as “activities relating to the disposal and treat-
ment of water produced from oil and gas wells.”143 The term of the
Lease was for ninety-nine years or until Lessee had discontinued its
business activities.144 Finally, the Lease provided that Lessee “shall
not have the right to sell more than 50% [of its interest or] to assign or
sublet its interest” in the Lease without the written consent of
Lessor.145
Two months later, Lessor entered into a service agreement (the
Agreement) with Royalco Oil & Gas Corp. (Well Operator).146 The
Agreement provided that “[i]n connection with [Well Operator] pro-
viding the [s]ervices hereunder, [Lessee] assigns to [Well Operator]
50% of [Lessee’s] interest.”147 Later in the year, Lessee failed to fur-
nish rental payments in accordance with the Lease, and Lessor de-
clared the Lease terminated.148 Lessor then sued Lessee for violation
of the terms of the Lease and sued Well Operator for a declaratory
judgment, inter alia, that Well Operator was a sublessee and had no
standing to furnish rental payments on behalf of Lessee to cure the
default that led to the termination of the Lease.149 The dispute fo-
cused on whether the Agreement was an assignment or a sublease.150
If ruled a sublease under the common law of Texas, Well Operator
139. Id. at 884.
140. Royalco Oil & Gas Corp. v. Stockhome Trading Corp., 361 S.W.3d 725 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2012, no pet.).
141. Id. at 728.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 728–29.
148. Id. at 729.
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would have no contractual right to enforce the Lease against Les-
sor.151 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Lessor,
and Well Operator appealed.152
The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting Well Operator’s argument
that under Texas oil and gas law Lessee had partially assigned 50% of
the Lease because the Agreement did not constitute an oil and gas
mineral lease, and that the common law of leases applied instead.153
Therefore, the court of appeals held that, as a matter of law, no assign-
ment had taken place because the Agreement did not cover either the
entire term of the underlying lease or the entire current interest of
Lessee of the underlying lease.154
151. Id. at 730.
152. Id. at 729.
153. Id. at 730–31.
154. Id. at 731–32.
